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CREDITORS' RIGHTS-REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO TORT CREDITOR WITHOUT
JuDGr.IENT IN MrcmGAN AND UNDER THE UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCBS

Acr-During negotiations for settlement of a tort claim between plaintiff and X,
X transferred some realty to his son, defendant. Plaintiff commenced suit against
X on the claim1 and, alleging that defendant and X were jointly liable on the
claim, sued defendant in equity to enjoin a prospective transfer of the property
by defendant to third parties. Held, for defendant; equity has no jurisdiction to

1

Plaintiff was successful in his suit against X, to which defendant was not made a

party. Irwin v. Meese, 325 Mich 344, 38 N.W. (2d) 867 (1949).
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enjoin the transfer of assets for a claim that is not secured by a lien or reduced to
a judgment. Irwin 11. Meese, 325 Mich. 349, 38 N.W. (2d) ?69 (1949).
By the great weight of authority, in the absence of statute, equity is without
jurisdiction to seize or enjoin the transfer of assets for a claim not secured by a
lien on the assets or not reduced to a judgment, even though the debtor is insolvent or a suit is pending to establish the debt.2 The mere existence of a debt
does not create any title, equity, or trust in the debtor's property upon which
the court of equity may act. 3 The rule is commonly justified by the belief that
to subject a debtor's property to mere unadjusted claims would expose him to
hardship and harassment at the suit of avaricious creditors.4 A garnishment proceeding would have been no more successful in Michigan, for garnishment does
not lie in tort actions unless reduced to a judgment because prior to judgment it
is impossible to determine what, if anything, is due the creditor.5 However, there
are two possible theories of recovery on the facts of the principal case. In the first
place, plaintiff could have proceeded on the theory that the transfer from X to
his son was a fraudulent conveyance. Under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, a conveyance may be set aside if it was made with the actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.6 This includes tort creditors without judgment.7 The actual intent to defraud may be inferred from the circumstances,
called ''badges of fraud." 8 Where the transaction takes place between relatives,
2 Smith v. Manning, 155 Ga. 209, 116 S.E. 813 (1923); Uhl v. Dillon, 10 Md. 500
(1857). In exceptional circumstances equity may take jurisdiction. Earle v. Grove, 92 Mich.
285, 52 N.W. 615 (1892). See generally, Sequestration in Equity, 116 A.L.R. 270 et seq.
(1938).
s "It is only by •.• liens that a creditor has any vested or specific right in the property
of his debtor. Before these liens are acquired, the debtor has full dominion over his property;
he may convert one species of property into another; and he may alienate to a purchaser."
Moran v. Dawes, Hopk. Ch. (N.Y.) 365 at 367 (1825). See 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §9 (1940).
4 Shufeldt v. Boehm, 96 ill. 560 (1880). But due to the failure of equity to act, statutes
relating to attachment and garnishment have been enacted to provide relief in these situations,
with appropriate safeguards. See 116 A.L.R. 270, 277 (1938).
5 22 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938) §27.1855. See Dinius v. Bolibrzuch, 270 Mich. 618,
259 N.W. 156 (1935); Talbert v. Solventol Chemical Products, Inc., 304 Mich. 557, 8 N.W.
(2d) 637 (1943). The argument that the amount due is not determinable without judgment
is not compelling, however, for in the same situation attachment lies. See infra, note 14.
6 U.F.C.A. §7; 19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §26.887. Furthermore, the same language
is found in 19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §26.971 [the equivalent of N.Y. Rev. Stat. (1828)
tit. III, §1] and has been construed to include the conception of constructive intent, as
distinguished from actual intent. Detroit, Bay City & Western R. Co. v. Lavell, 224 Mich.
572, 195 N.W. 58 (1923).
7 U.F.C.A. §1; 19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §26.881, defines creditors as those having
"any claim, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or
contingent." This is generally construed to include ordinary tort creditors. Gatto v. Boyd,
137 Misc. 156, 241 N.Y.S. 626 (1930); Iden v. Huber, 259 Mich. 3, 242 N.W. 818 (1932).
See 119 A.L.R. 949 (1939); 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES
§76 (1940).
s "The only method of determining actual intent is by a consideration of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Surrounding circumstances which usually accompany
an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors and from which fraud may be inferred are
called 'badges of fraud.'" Bentley v. Callie, 289 Mich. 74 at 77-78, 286 N.W. 163 (1939).
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only slight additional evidence is needed to establish a prima facie case of fraudulent intent.9 In the instant case the further fact is shown that both of the parties
to the transfer knew of the existence of plaintiff's claim at the time of the transfer.10
An even stronger showing could be made with the establishment of a lack of
consideration, insolvency,11 or a retention of possession by the transferor, but
under the facts presented the creditor could make a prima facie case of intent
to defraud. In the second place, the creditor, having alleged that defendant was
jointly liable with his father, could have recognized the transfer as valid and
attached the property to satisfy his claim against the defendant.12 This remedy
is available under the Michigan statute for tort claims before judgment if a
proper showing is made.18 Moreover, the fact that the creditor recovered judgment against the father does not affect his right to pursue his remedy against
defendant for it is only the satisfaction of a judgment that precludes relief against
others jointly and severally liable.14 It follows, therefore, that had the instant
creditor utilized these specific remedies rather than :i:elying upon the somewhat
nebulous concept of "irreparable harm" to invoke equity jurisdiction, he would
not have gone without recovery.
Colvin A. Peterson, Jr., S.Ed.

9 "Dealings between husband and wife which would operate to the disadvantage of
creditors of either of them must be subjected to exacting scrutiny, and cannot be upheld
unless free from doubt and suspicion.'' Fanning v. Dennis, 119 W.Va. 615 at 617, 198 S.E.
532 (1938). See l GLENN, FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCBs AND PRBFBRBNCBS §307 (1940).
lO "Where a purchaser has knowledge of any fact sufficient to put him upon inquiry
as to the existence of some right or title in conffict with that he is about to purchase, he is
presumed either to have made the inquiry ... or to have been guilty of a degree of negligence
equally fatal to his claim ••• [as] a bona fide purchaser.'' Williamson v. Brown, 15 N.Y. 354
(syll.) (1857). See Webber v. Jackson, 79 Mich. 175, 44 N.W. 591 (1890).
llJn the case of insolvency, under U.F.C.A. §4; 19 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §26.884
no actual fraudulent intent is necessary, it being enough that insolvency is present.
1 2 Under 22 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938) §27.l 782 it is required that the plaintiff set forth
in detail his cause of action and the circuit judge may authorize attachment; the plaintiff
must also furnish bond.
13This is specifically provided in 22 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938) §27.1782: The applicable ground for attachment in the instant case is that "the defendant has assigned, disposed of or concealed, or is about to assign, dispose of or conceal any of his property with
the intent to defraud his creditors.''
14 Larson v. Anderson, 108 Wash. 157, 182 P. 957 (1919); Ellis v. Stenning, [1932]
2 Ch. D. 81; PROSSER, TORTS §109 (1941).

